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IN THE SU-PREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FTAH STATE
BOARD, et al,

BUILDING

Plaintiffs,

vs.

GEORGE R. ROMNEY and M.
\VALLIS ROMNEY, d/b/a G.
l\L\ lTRlCE R 0 M N E Y COMPANY, a Partnership, et al,
Defendants, Third-Party
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Case No.
10143

vs.

INDUSTRIAL I N DE M N I T Y
C0 J.VIP ANY, a corporation,
Third-Party Defendant
and Respondent.

BRIEF OF

APPELL~TS

ST.A_TE::\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought against the General Contractor, Romney Company, and its bonding company by
creditors of a subcontractor, with a Third-Party Com3
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plaint by the General Contractor over against said subcontractor's bonding company.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the Pre-Trial,the General Contractor's (Appellant) Third-Party Complaint over against the subcontractor's bonding company, Industrial Indemnity
Company (Respondent) , was ordered dismissed and a
subsequent Judgment of Dismissal was filed. The balance of the case involving the creditors' claims against
the General Contractor was tried and a judgment taken
against the General Contractor. Most of the creditors'
claims were compromised and paid by theGeneral Contractor, Romney, just prior to trial. However, Rocky
Mountain Refrigeration Company, the original plaintiff, obtained said judgment, its claim not being settled.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The General Contractor, Romney, appellant herein,
seeks reversal of the Judgment dismissing its ThirdParty Complaint against the subcontractor's bonding
company, Industrial Indemnity Company, respondent
herein, and seeks to remand the case to the trial court
for trial of the Third-Party complaint legal and factual
issues.
4
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rmnney Company, General Contractor and appellunt herein, entered into a contract with the Utah State
Building Board to construct the Rehabilitation Center
nt the University of Utah (Exhibits D-17, (P-3) (R.
-t:J) • Romney furnished the bond required under Title
14.. 1·1. Utah Code Annotated (R. 170, 225), wherein
the State of Utah was named as obligee, Romney was
named as principal, and American Surety Company
was named surety and obligor.
Subcontractor, Walsh Plumbing Company, had a
subcontract with Romney to do the plumbing portion
of the general contract work (Ex. D-16) (R. 43).
'Valsh furnished in connection with said subcontract a
bond, wherein appellant was named as obligee and
owner, 'Valsh was named as principal, and Industrial
Indemnity Company, respondent herein, was named as
surety and obligor (Pre-Trial Ex. 1).
During and after construction, Romney paid Walsh
for the subcontract work in reliance upon Lien Waivers
furnished by the Walsh creditors (R. 49, 50, 51 (Ex.
P. 10). 'Valsh, however, either did not pay these creditors, or paid them by check, which checks were returned
because of insufficient funds ( R. 23, 26, 36, 44, 259)
(Ex. P-9).
These individual creditors did not give the written
notice as is specified in respondent's bond (R. 226) .
Said notice requirement of the bond in effect states
5

he S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and L
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

that the creditor or claimant must notify in writing
within 90 days of completion of the creditor's work any
two of the three parties to the bond, i.e., the obligee,
Romney, the principal, Walsh, and the obligor, re~
spondent.
. The bond further defines a claimant under the bond
as one furnishing labor and materials on the project
(Pre-Trial Ex. 1) .
The Walsh creditors thereafter brought this action
against appellant and its bonding company, American
Surety Company, under Section 14-1-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, but did not sue respondent, Walsh's
bonding company. Romney answered the Complaints
of the original plaintiff and intervening plaintiffs, deny~
ing liability upon various grounds (Pleadings, R. 6, 34,
46, 53, 63). Romney also by its Third-PartyComplaint,
complained over against respondent, third-pai.-ty defendant Walsh's bonding company, upon said. bond,
(Pre-Trial Ex. 1) for any judgment obtained against
Romney by the Walsh creditors (R. 8-10, 28-30).
The case came on for Pre-Trial before Judge A. H.
Ellett on February 24, 1964 (R. 225-228). At the PreTrial, respondent claimed, "that the bond was not made
for the benefit of the Romney Company, but was made
for the benefit of materialmen, and since no materialmen had given notice as prescribed by. Paragraph 3 (a)
of the Industrial Indemnity bond," Romney could not
recover. The Court, in Paragraph 9 of the Pre-Trial
Order, stated:
6
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"The Court will hold as a matter of law that
Homney cannot recover under Pre-Trial Exhibit I." ( R. 226) .
the Pre-Trial, issues between the plaintiffs and
Homney involving various defenses were set forth and
set down for subsequent trial (R. 225-228). The primary
issue remaining for trial insofar as each of the plaintiffs
were concerned involved the reasonableness of some of
the plaintiffs' claims and the question as to whether or
not the work was actually performed on the project
(R. 226).
•\ t

At the trial, appellant defended against the claim
of Rocky ~fountain Refrigeration Company, but was
unsuccessful and a judgment was obtained against
appellant. Rocky Mountain was one of the unpaid creditors of 'V alsh Plumbing Company which appellant
contends gives it the right to recover over against respondent. Just prior to trial, appellant was able to
compromise and settle all other creditors' claims (R.
262-264) (R. 241-249).

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE C 0 U R T ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST
THE RESPONDENT.
7
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A. THE FAILURE OF CLAIMANTS TO
GIVE PROPER NOTICE DOES NOT BAR AN
ACTION ON THE BOND BY THE APPELLANT OBLIGEE.
(I) THE BOND PROVISIONS DO NOT
PRECLUDE RECOVERY BY THE OBLIGEE.

Appellant, Romney, is the Owner-Obligee under
the bond. Romney required Walsh, the Subcontractor,
to furnish a bond "for the satisfactory performance of
this agreement" (the Subcontract). (Ex. D-16 and 2nd
page of Pre-Trial Ex. 1) . The bond itself provides in
part, as follows:
"Principal ... and Surety are held and firmly
bound unto ... Romney-· .. as Obligee, hereinafter called Owner, for the use and benefit of
claimants as hereinbelow defined ... "
Paragraph 1, page 2, of the bond defines a claimant
as one furnishing labor and materials to the Principal.
Paragraph 3, in requiring written notice be given to
any two of the following: The Principal, the Owner
(Romney), or the Surety (Respondent), only makes
this requirement of a claimant. There is nothing in any
of the conditions precedent set forth in the bond requiring the 0 bligee on the bond to give notice as a prerequisite to filing suit.
The Court, in its Pre-Trial Order, stated:
"8. The parties agree that no one gave any
notice to the Industrial Indemnity Company or
8
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to \ Valsh Plumbing Company or to Romney
Con1pany as required in Paragraph 3 (a) on Page
2 of the Industrial Indemnity Company bond.
"9. The Industrial Indemnity Company claims
that the bond was not made for the benefit of the
Romney Company, but was made for the benefit
of materialmen, and since no materialmen have
given notice as prescribed by paragraph 3 (a) of
the Industrial Indemnity bond, the Court will
hold as a matter of law that Romney Company
cannot recover under pre-trial Exhibit 1."

The court thus in effect held that the Obligee was
barred from suing on the bond because the claimants
had not given written notice. Obviously, the failure to
give such a notice cannot affect the rights of the Obligee.
Had the bonding company intended that the Obligee
give notice, or be barred from any action because of a
failure to give notice, then it could and should have so
provided in the bond. In Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company v. Orr, 321 P. 2d 373 (Okla.) (1958),
the bond requires the Obligee, as a condition precedent
to any right of recovery, to furnish a written notice of
default to the Surety. Bonds are construed against the
Surety which draws them and it must be assumed that
if such a notice was to be applied against an Obligee,
the bond would so indicate. See Chapman v. HoageJ
296 U.S. 526; Stearns Law of Suretyship, 5th Edition,
page 12; and Corp. of Pres. of L.D.S. v. H artfordJ 98
t'lah 297, 95 P.2d 736, wherein this Court said: "But
sureties in building contracts are not entitled to any
notice of default unless the agreement specifically provides therefor."
9
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Furthermore ,the notice required in this bond leaves
the Obligee completely uninformed and at the mercy
of the claimant and Surety. For example, the provisions
require the claimant to notify any two of the three parties to the bond, and thus a notice can be given to the
Principal and Surety without being given to the Obligee.
And as a converse to this, the Obligee would not know
(and did not) whether or not notice had been given
and would thus not be able to protect itself in order
to preserve its right under the bond. Thus it is apparent
that the notice required was not intended to relate in
:;~.ny way to the 0 bligee. In our case, it is evident that
the failure of the claimant to give such a notice was
not a failure of the Obligee. However, under the Court's
interpretation of this provision, the Obligee is deprived
of its right on the bond through a failure over which it
had no control, or knowledge thereof.
Thus, it is manifestly inequitable, impractical and
contrary to the provisions and intent of the bond to
deprive the Obligee of its right on the bond because of
the failure of a claimant to give written notice of its
claim. Such a provision could bar the claimant, but
certainly not the Obligee.
(2) APPELLANT ROMNEY'S RIGHTS

AS OBLIGEE ARE SEPARATE FROM THE
RIGHTS OF THE CLAIMANTS.
It is fundamental in these construction bonds that
the Obligee's rights are separate and independent from
the rights of the claimants. As stated in Stearns Law
10
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of Su,rdyahip. 5th Ed., Par. 8:18, p. 266, entitled,
~~Bonds to Secure Building Contracts":
"The Surety's bond is of a dual nature and
contains several undertakings running to the
Owner, the Obligee on the bond: One for his own
protection, and the other for the ben.efit of third
persons who furnish labor or materials."
Traditionally, the Obligee has the right of action
on the bond. This right has been extended by ·statute
and by various provisions of ~onstructoin bonds to also
give a right of action o~ the ·bond to those £lirnis~ing
labor and materials to 'the Principal. I'n H ochimar 'v~
MarlJland Casualty Company~ 114 F.2d 948 (Maryland) (1940), the Court separated the Obligee's rights
from those of the beneficiary's under the bond, stating:
I

"However, the Obligee's premature. payment
of retained percentages cannot affect the rights
of third-party beneficiaries against the Surety."
In other words, th~ failure of t:Qe Obligee to pr9tect
its right under the . bond cannot affect the right of :;t
third-party beneficiary under the bond. J u~t as surely,
we must assume that the failure of a third~party b~:p.e
ficiary to protect its rights cannot affect the right of ~he
Obligee.
In Equitable S'l~;rety Company v. U.S.~ ex rel Me~
Millan, 234 U.S. 448, 454, the Surety claimed as a
defense against the materialmen that the Principal and
Obligee had changed the contract which the· bond was
intended to cover. The Court held that such a. defense

11
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could not be maintained against the materialmen, statIng:
" ... The obligation (the bond) has a dual
aspect, it being given in the first place to secure
to the government the faithful performance of
all obligations which a contractor may assume
toward it; and, in the second place, to protect
third persons from whom the contractor may obtain materials or labor; and, that these two agreements are as distinct as if contained in separate
instruments."
See also Griffith, et al v. Rundle, et al., 63 P. 199
(Wash.) (1900). In 50 .A.m. Jur., p. 1025, it is stated:
"The natural person to bring suit on the bond
or other obligation of a surety is, of course, the
obligee."
The principle that the Obligee and the creditors or
beneficiaries have independent and separate causes of
action or rights under the bond is set forth in the Utah
cases and in the Contractor's Bonding Statutes, particularly Section 14-1-2, f7tah Code Annotated. In
State, et al v. Campbell Building Company ,et al, 94
Utah 326, 77 P. 2d 341, the Court discusses this statute,
indicating that the Obligee does have a right under the
bond separate from that of the creditors. The Court
says with reference to this statute and the rights of the
parties:
"The restrictions are twofold: to give the Obligee a priority to determine and protect any
claim it may have, and to fix a one-year limitation
on the Surety's liability to other creditors. When,
therefore, the Obligee has had an opportunity to

12
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determine if it has any claims against the Surety,
and assert the same, there are no good reasons
why other creditors of the contractor should not
be permitted to enforce their claims . . . The
Statute is not for the benefit of the contractor,
but for the benefit of the Obligee, creditors, and
Surety."
The wording of the statute itself provides for two
separate actions: One by the Obligee, and one by the
creditors or beneficiaries under the bond. The Obligee
is given the first right of action under the bond, and
only after a period of six months within which the Obligee has the right to ·bring its action, can the creditors
thereupon intervene or bring their own action on the
bond.
Admittedly, the bond in question here is not a statutory contractor's bond, such as is required under Title
14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, and such as is discussed
in the Campbell case, supra. However, the wording of
the subject bond, wherein it provides that the bond is for
the use and benefit of claimants, to-wit, those furnishing
labor and materials to the Principal, is the s:;tme wording
as is requried under said statute and in the bonds dis~
cussed in the Campbell case and other Utah cases cited
below. There is no doubt but that the Obligee has a right
of action on the bond, which is made for the benefit ·of
those furnishing labor and materials. In Uiah State
Building Commission v. Great American Indemnity
Company, 105 Utah 11, 140 P. 2d 763, the Court discussed the statutory bond and whether or not the Obligee
had a right thereon even though it was defective in its

13
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corporate status. The Court said, in giving the Obligee
a right under such a bond:
''The Utah State Building Commission was the
only proper Obligee on the bond, and the only
entity that could have properly brought this action."
Also, in Johnson Service Company v. E. H. MomnJ
171 N.E. 692 (N.Y.) (1930), the court held that the
Obligee under the bond had a cause of action thereon
even though the bond was conditioned upon the payment
by the contractor of laborers and materialmen. The court
said:
"For a valuable consideration, the Contractor
and the Surety have covenanted with the municipality that payment shall be made to materialmen and laborers whether protected by a lien or
not. If they are not paid, the promisee intervenes
and collects for their use the payment that is
due."
See also Colorado Fuel & Iron Company v. Dodge} 52
P. 637 (Colo.) (1898), and Bristol v. Bostwick} 240
S.W. 774 (Tenn.) (1917), wherein the Obligee is given
a right to bring an action in its own right, as well as for
the use and benefit of the Principal's creditors. In
Deluxe Glass Company v. Martin} 116 Utah 144, 208
P. 2d 1127, the court holds that the Owner is entitled to
sue on the bond, given to protect the Owner from failure
of the Principal to pay for all labor and materials on
the project.

14
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B. ACTU~\L NOTICE IN LIEU OF WRITTEN NOTICE IS SUFFICIENT.
The Court ruled in its Pre-Trial Order and J udgment, to the effect that written notice was not given
and thus the Obligee's right was lost. It is well accepted
that the notice provisions in a bond must be reasonable.
Reasonable notice also consists of actual notice. The
Court, however, ruled without permitting the case to
go to trial to determine whether or not there was actual
notice or waiver of notice. (R. 139, 229). See Corp.
of Pres. of L.D.S. v. Hartford~ supra; 50 Am. Jur.
p. 984, 1115.
Furthermore, there was no showing, in determining
whether or not the notice was reasonable, that the Surety
Company was in any way prejudiced by the failure to
give said notice. Again, this is a factual matter which
should have been developed at the trial, but which was
elin1inated as a matter of law by the Court's ruling and
Judgment.
The notice required by the bond, even assuming it
has application to the Obligee, is not reasonable and is
arbitrary in its ultimate result. The Obligee for whose
benefit the bond is given, has no opporunity of knowing
whether or not the condition precedent of written notice
is being complied with. The notice requirements give
the claimant an election to ignore the Obligee .Thus,
if the Obligee is bound by this notice requirement, it
can be and was arbitrarily cut off from its rights under
the bond. Such a notice, if ,applied to the Obligee, i~

15
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arbitrary and capricious in its result, and is, therefore,
an unreasonable, unconscionable and unenforceable
provision of the bond. Courts will not uphold an arbitrary notice requirement. The Obligee should, therefore,
not be bound by such an unreasonable contractual requirement. Courts interpret contracts, where possible,
to give validity to individual contractual provisions.
To give validity to this provision, the court cannot and
should not apply it to the Obligee.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING THE
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL ON APRIL 2,
1964 AS A NUNC PRO TUNC JUDGMENT TO
BE EFFECTIVE FEBRUARY 21, 1964.
The Pre-Trial Order entered February 21, 1964,
was not a final judgment from which an appeal could
be taken. The judgment entered April 2, 1964, was a
final judgment from which an appeal could be taken.
The April 2, 1964, judgment cannot be made nunc pro
tunc to take away rights of appeal which otherwise
would still be valid and effective. The filing of the judgment April 2, 1964, initiates the running of the time for
appeal. United States v. F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co.,
356

u.s.

227.

SUMMARY
It is clear that the court has failed to distinguish
between the rights of an Obligee and the rights of claim16
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au ts under the bond. This bond was required by the
Obligee as Owner to assure that the Principal (Subcontractor) would pay for its labor and material furnished under the Subcontract. The Subcontractor did
not pay for said labor and materials, and as a result,
the Obligee was sued not under the Subcontractor's
bond, but under its own public contract bond. Obligee
is thus without a remedy because of the court's ruling.
The court has now denied the 0 bligee its rights
under the bond upon the theory that the claimants'
failure to file the necessary written notice eliminates all
causes of action on the bond. The default of the claimants, beyond the Obligee's control, cannot and should
not prejudice the rights of the Obligee. This notice requirement is unreasonable and in no way applicable to
Obligee. The case should be remanded for trial so that
the rights of the Obligee-appellant against respondent
under its bond may be determined.
Respectfully submitted,
ELLIOTT LEE PRATT
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
Attorneys for Appellants
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